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1. The recapture of Madioen city, the center of the revolution, was made possible according to schedule by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). The results of this struggle, accompanied by a great deal of hardships and sacrifices in the fulfillment of this important duty, are truly commendable and possess the best psychological effect. The public in general became upset and a feeling of hopelessness prevailed when they heard of the coup d'etat at Madioen, however, with the recapture of Madioen by the TNI, the public was put at ease. It was regrettable that the leaders of the revolution such as Moeso, Amir Sjarifoedin, Setiadjit, Marceto Daroesman, Djokosoedjono and others had fled the city before the entry of our troops.
2. In the operation to retake Madioen city, the MBB of East Java and MBK of Soerabaja played an important role.
3. Stories of the cruelties of the revolutionists toward the TNI, Pamong Projdo, CPM, and opposition parties (Masjumi, Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), Serikat Boeroeh Goela Danoeoesodo) were told by our men who saw cruelties in their fight toward cities which were held by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) army of Moeso. At Magetan nearly all the officials of the Pamong Projdo and the National Police were killed. Also at Goerang-gerang there were mass murders of TNI soldiers, CPM and National policemen, who were shot by the revolutionists. The leaders of the revolution fled to Doengoes, a place at the foot of Mt. Willis and approximately 10 kilometers from Madioen, but later this place was occupied by our troops. Again there was a great number of dead bodies of TNI soldiers, Pamong Projdo, National Police and others opposing the Front Demokrat Repoebliek (FDR), and many of them were unrecognizable because of the mutilations perpetrated. A thousand prisoners of the PKI would have met the same fate, if our troops had not intercepted an order from the revolutionists to kill all the prisoners and proceeded quickly to free them.

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letter of 16 October 1973 from the  
Director of Central Intelligence to the  
Archivist of the United States.

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4. There is no news yet from Madioen region concerning the fate of approximately 150 officials.
5. In pursuing and mopping up, our army is faced with difficulties and complexities. Since the recapture of territory from the revolutionists, the affairs of the territory have been disorganized, consequently we have been forced to assume the duties of the Pamong Prodjo, police, and information officials until such time as the affairs of the territory are organized again. Despite such situations, the mopping up group was able to get underway; consequently all the territory near Madioen at this time has been liberated from the control of the revolutionists, especially the region around Patjitan up to that point where the remaining revolutionists were pursued. It is now a good time to encircle them. From Solo our army has arrived at Poenoeng, approximately 15 kilometers west of Patjitan.
6. In the Semarang region, the rebels have been defeated in attempting to withdraw to the region of Pati; consequently, this region is again in our control.
7. In the region of Pati, there was a sharp engagement at Tjepoe, a city which the rebels time and again attempted to capture. These attempts, however, ended in failure each time. Since many of these engagements were participated in by the oil workers who were urged on by the rebels to sacrifice (approximately 2,000 persons), many houses were burned by the rebels. Our army also burned many houses in order to be secure against snipers. Two oil tanks were burned by the rebels and slight damages were inflicted on the oil refineries, however, the extent of this damage is not clear. The refineries, it is said, are being worked at present by 4,000 laborers who are loyal to the government. The refineries have not decreased production. How many technicians were carried off by the rebels? The Tjepoe police informs us that 15 officials have disappeared, 2 have been buried, and 6 wounded.
8. The following are still held by the revolutionists: a section of Koedoes city, Pati city, Rembang and Djepara. Our troops, however, are changing such situations, and the rebels who hold these cities will be unable to escape. Suppression of these cities is now only a question of time. At one time, a certain leader of a rebel group wished to give himself up under certain conditions. This was forwarded by Lieutenant Colonel Soediarso to the Military Governor (Colonel Gatot Soebroto) of Solo, Semarang, Pati and Madioen. The wish was not only turned down by the Military Governor, it is said, but it was ordered that Lt. Col. Boediarso (who had already resigned) present himself before the Commander-in-Chief.
9. The revolution in the region of Kedoe (Parakan, Tjandiroto) has been extinguished completely, as many of the rebel groups are surrendering to our army, with or without weapons; some have fled to Dutch-occupied territory. It must be noted that the groups who flee to occupied territory near the status quo line are "met" by the Dutch Army and later allowed to escape by being picked up by trucks. The demands of our army leaders for the custody of these refugees have been refused by the Dutch.
10. In the Special Territory of Jogjakarta, during the latter part of September and the beginning of October 1948, the revolutionists made an attempt to create confusion at the Kabupatèn of Wonosari (Goenoengkidol) by seizing members of the Pamong Prodjo, cutting down telephone lines, etc.; however, the hard work and cooperation between the Military Police and the Pamong Prodjo resulted in order.
11. Aside from disturbances formented in the Malang region (Donomoeljo) and south Blitar (Loedojo), which were quickly suppressed by the army and police, other regions did not report unusual activities.

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II. Political

12. Along with the countermeasures taken by the government to suppress the revolution by the PKI of Moeso and company, various political parties, especially the Gerakan Revolusi Rakjat (GRR), began to manifest unusual activities with the hope of filling the vacuum created by the revolution. A bid for the support of people, who are worried and confused, will result in clarifying the situation for the people, and if the government eradicates ignorance with regard to the whole incident, then new dangers of unrest will have been eliminated. The tragedy of Solo is that the bid for power will again center in that city.
13. The objection to the GRR is, in principle, the same as the objection to the FDR before the outbreak of the revolution. The leaders of the GRR are, at present, working to unify all parties which belong to the GRR into a single party called the Partai Rakjat Moerba (PRM). Their efforts, for the most part, have been successful. In meetings they denounced the steps taken by Moeso's PKI, however, this front that they present to the government is the same as that of the FDR. It is only a matter of a difference in form and in the things they say.
14. In order to lighten the government's task, efforts are being made to gather all wayward elements and different types of political talents and to channel them, without decreasing the number of democratic rights, into a single stream, the Nationale Volksdemocratic (People's National Democracy). A certain effort in this direction was made in the case of a weekly publication Merah Postih (Pure Red), supported by a Mr. Ali Boediarjo. The first publication unfortunately contained articles critical of Sjahrir's party. However, the big hope is that the efforts will be successful. This can be cultivated for a good purpose.
15. In view of the political situation existing in Dutch-occupied territory, it can be predicted that before long a serious crisis will exist. In documents captured from the revolutionists, plans were found calling for an uprising not only in Republican territory, but also in Dutch-occupied territory. There are signs which clearly indicate that parts of the plan have been put into operation. During this period fires broke out in the Soerabaja naval base. The Dutch announced that this fire was caused by a coal spark. How naive! The day after the fire a large Communist round-up was made. Also, there were daily attacks against plantations and sabotage of trains in West Java.
16. With such activities increasing at the same time that Dr. van Mook is being replaced by a man who reacts more violently to the general situation, it is possible that the Dutch will initiate a second military action. This prediction is based on troop concentrations near the status quo lines, which are said to be for the purpose of preventing the infiltration of Communists into Dutch-occupied territory. It appears, however, that the troops are for a larger operations (tanks, artillery). Information received indicates that the security police in the demobilized zones are being replaced by regular troops.

III. Economic

17. As a result of the revolution by Moeso's PKI, the economy of our nation has been placed in a critical position. The loss of 20,000,000 roepiahs in bills, which had just been printed, at Ponorogo, the destruction of trains and large roads, the theft of wealth from hundreds of government officials who were taken prisoner or killed, all had a great impact on our economy. Consequently, the price of food has risen, and some operations and projects have ceased because of lack of national money.
18. If the Dutch do not quickly lift the blockade, the Republic will find itself with a severe economic crisis on its hands.

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IV. Security

19. According to reports which were received from regions firmly controlled by the government, serious crimes such as assault, gangsterism, and murders have decreased somewhat since 18 September 1948 (after the outbreak of the revolution). Consequently, one is led to the conclusion that crimes committed before 18 September 1948 were systematically perpetrated by the gangs who were at the time following the instructions of the rebels to create confusion and paralyze the government.
20. At this time it can be said that the center of the revolt has been crushed, although the leaders of the revolt have not yet been captured. It will not be possible to wipe out the gangs immediately since they have scattered and will avoid large-scale battles. These scattered bands which have retreated to mountains present a serious danger to nearby regions and cities. The situation creates much work for the army, police, and Pamong Projo. It is strongly felt that there is a lack of weapons and strong, healthy personnel. The mopping-up of these bands by the army was initiated to rid the populace of dissatisfied elements and to restore the people's faith in the government, which was both embarrassed and humiliated by the revolution.
21. Persons who have been proven to have followed orders in the revolution have been apprehended, and those who have helped or menaced the general peace and order have been closely questioned.
22. The above is the situation in the nation to the day indicated at the head of the report.

Jogjakarta, 18 October 1948

## Additional notes to the report follow:

Clearly the following is possible:

1. If unrest in occupied territory increases, all of Holland will probably say: "This is the doing of Jogjakarta. Jogjakarta must stop this unrest." This is naturally nonsense, but Holland will surely say that--actually it is only the pointed barb with which they will start another police action.
2. More than ever before, we must be on guard against the purpose and methods of Holland! It is clear that if Holland undertakes another military move, Moeso's PKI will have more than sufficient grounds for another revolt! This will turn the Republic and all of Indonesia into a land of devils and chaos, where one would be unable to lift his head. Only a non-democratic regime offers any defense against Moeso's PKI!
3. The economic blockade must be broken as quickly as possible by a foreign power.

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